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Mobile apps have become a convenient way 
to provide health information and communi-
cation services directly in the hands of clini-
cians and consumers. Apps can be used to 
support consumers in a variety of health tasks 
to manage chronic diseases, support lifestyle 
changes and in self- diagnosis. For clinicians, 
they can improve access to patient informa-
tion and clinical decision support tools at the 
point- of- care. While the use of apps in health-
care can bring many benefits, poor quality 
information and gaps in software function-
ality can pose new risks to patient safety.1 For 
example, an app to support women under-
going breast cancer surgery was found to 
increase postoperative anxiety and depres-
sion.2 Another app providing an intervention 
to reduce distress and alcohol consumption 
was found to increase heavy drinking, anxiety 
and distress.3
At their core, apps are software that run 
on a mobile device. When it comes to devel-
oping software, and assuring its quality, safety 
and security, rigorous engineering is funda-
mental. By applying engineering processes, 
developers should ensure that software is 
designed to requirements with safety and 
security integrated into the design, including 
regulatory requirements; hazards can be 
systematically identified and mitigated, not 
only prior to and during deployment but 
through the life of the system by monitoring 
use and preventative maintenance.4 However, 
these processes break down with mobile apps 
because they are a unique form of software 
that is easy to develop and deploy. For a small 
subset of health apps that are developed as a 
medical device or tethered to a device, engi-
neering processes are preserved, in part, by 
regulatory requirements.5 However, the vast 
majority of health apps fall outside the remit 
of effective regulations in most nations.
This commentary examines the problem of 
assuring, or establishing, justified confidence 
in the clinical quality, safety and security of 
health apps. The overall objective is to raise 
awareness about this often neglected topic, 
and to highlight the need for standards 
and oversight. We begin by considering the 
inherent complexity of formalising processes 
for designing apps, and then examine aspects 
of their development, implementation and 
use that pose challenges when it comes to 
laying down clinical governance which is 
the set of formal processes that dictates how 
patient safety is ensured.4 We argue that 
there is fluidity in app function and design 
that presents a challenge to identify mature 
use cases necessary to develop a clear under-
standing of risk and expected performance. 
Probable causes are the low entry barrier to 
app creation and absence of certification 
barrier to distribution to the public. Thus, 
apps are ubiquitous, posing risks on a large- 
scale where traditional clinical governance 
approaches may be too slow.6 We show that 
the disparate contexts in which apps are 
developed are not uniformly conducive to 
assurance processes. Risks are also increased 
because there is no central surveillance of the 
use of health apps.
APPS ARE HIGHLY VERSATILE
The versatility of apps means they can be used 
to support a wide variety of health informa-
tion or communication services at all levels of 
care delivery and in the community. As apps 
can support a single service or a combination 
of services, their function may not be clear 
at the outset to designers. A fundamental 
problem here is that there is no standard use 
cases for apps of any type and therefore the 
implementation of information and commu-
nication services is ad hoc.7 While NICE’s 
guidelines for digital health technologies 
distinguish broad categories of functionality,8 
their implementation is left to developers. For 
instance, asthma management: the use case 
for what specific functions apps must support, 
including information provision, peak flow 
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and symptom diaries, and medication tracking, is fluid 
and currently evolving with developments in technology 
and medical research. While the functionality of apps, or 
any other software to support health services, should be 
based on clinical standards that provide evidence- based 
requirements for information and communication, the 
slow rate at which such standards are produced presents 
a challenge for clinical governance because without stan-
dardised use cases, apps are providing functionality where 
there is no clear understanding of risk.
The lack of standard use cases makes it difficult to lay 
down clear rules for clinical governance of apps. With 
current regulations for medical devices, there is only a 
subtle difference between apps which are considered 
medical devices and those that are not. For example, 
symptom checkers are considered to be a medical device 
if they provide a subset of medical conditions matching 
the symptoms entered by users, indicate the likelihood 
of a match, or provide treatment recommendations.9 
Yet, those that list all conditions matching the symptoms 
entered by users and provide signposts to suitable care 
are not considered medical devices.9
Apps also pose challenges for applying clinical gover-
nance processes because they are used at all levels of care 
delivery and in the community. For instance, consumer 
health information is the purview of public health where 
the reliability and credibility of information is a prime 
consideration. In contrast, prevention and management 
of disease involve formal care delivery settings often with 
treatment by health professionals. This raises complex 
issues in processes to assess and manage risk because 
across these contexts, there is no consensus about the 
level of acceptable safety among health service providers, 
clinicians and regulators.
ANYONE CAN BUILD AN APP
The sheer number of health apps and their ubiquity is 
a consequence of how easy it is to develop and publish 
them. It is estimated that there are over 325 000 health 
apps available in the leading app stores. Apps can be 
created using online platforms that automate develop-
ment, distribution and maintenance; such platforms (eg, 
Appy Pie) do not require any software programming 
skills. While there are no data about the use of such plat-
forms for health apps, in a recent study of 2.3 million 
apps on Google Play, 11% were created using such online 
platforms.10 Both clinicians and developers with little or 
no formal software engineering background are, there-
fore, rapidly developing apps. Such an ad hoc approach 
to development means that developers are unaware of 
underlying safety and security issues that can ultimately 
pose serious risks to data security and privacy. The lack 
of accountability is a serious issue because qualified engi-
neers are professionals who can be held accountable 
for their actions while this may not be the case for clini-
cians and citizen developers (‘citizen developer’ is a new 
term implying a mix of skill and informality, even naivety 
compared with professional practice).8
Another rapid method for development is via mobile 
application frameworks which provide many pre- made 
components that can be used as building blocks for 
most health information and communication functions 
(eg, Ionic and React Native). This hybrid approach to 
build apps does not require developers to have extensive 
coding expertise or software development skills compared 
with the process of building native apps. The availability 
of hybrid approaches has no doubt contributed to the 
growing numbers of health apps, but the quality is not 
guaranteed because these tools have opened up devel-
opment to citizen developers, clinicians and professional 
developers with varying levels of software engineering 
expertise. Worse, these building blocks were not origi-
nally developed for clinical use.
DEVELOPMENT OCCURS IN DIVERSE SETTINGS
Because the entry barrier to app creation is low, they are 
being developed in formal and informal settings. The 
sociotechnical disparity of these contexts poses signifi-
cant challenges when it comes to formalising processes 
for software development and clinical governance.4 For 
large- scale health IT systems, software development 
is typically undertaken by an IT business entity. For an 
electronic medical records system that is developed by a 
large multinational company, the organisation provides 
a formal setting for software engineering processes to be 
undertaken. The company will have clinical and tech-
nical expertise, including a large and well- organised IT 
group as well as organisational structures, policies and 
procedures to govern the quality, safety and security of 
the software it produces.11 An app developed in such 
business settings should be subject to the same rigorous 
engineering and clinical governance processes not just 
for regulatory reasons but also for reputation reasons. In 
contrast, smaller health IT businesses and new businesses, 
such as start- up companies, may not provide the infra-
structure conducive to formal software engineering and 
clinical governance processes—and they typically have 
smaller budgets available for the development compared 
to a large business entity.
Another setting for app development is within health-
care organisations, including providers, government 
agencies and not- for- profit organisations. While these 
settings have deep clinical expertise, those without a large 
and well- organised IT group are unlikely to have technical 
expertise and established software engineering processes 
for building and maintaining apps in- house; they may rely 
on third- party developers which reduces accountability. 
Another issue with healthcare organisations is that their 
clinical governance structures and processes are gener-
ally not set up to provide oversight for apps. With citizen 
developers, the informal context means that formal soft-
ware development and clinical governance processes 
may altogether be absent. Because of a lack of skills and 
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experience, citizen developers may be unaware of best- 
practice development methods and standards. Develop-
ment may proceed without engaging users, apps may not 
be maintained and updated in a timely manner, quality 
control may be missing and postmarket surveillance is 
often omitted—and so on. These problems also occur 
in apps developed bottom- up by clinicians on their own. 
Many apps are unplanned and grow ‘organically’: some 
are by- products of local clinical system improvement proj-
ects (eg, handover or antibiotic prescribing apps). While 
a bottom- up approach is advantageous for innovation 
and clinical engagement, apps developed in this manner 
may not be sustainable beyond pilot testing. Clinicians 
worried about excessive bureaucracy may not engage with 
formal organisational processes for software development 
and clinical governance. Ironically, some apps start life 
through clinicians working around perceived problems 
with organisational policies and processes. Strategies to 
formalise app development, therefore, need to account 
for the diverse contexts where they are being developed. 
It is noteworthy that citizen development and marketing 
of pharmaceuticals is illegal.
NO GATE AT IMPLEMENTATION, LITTLE FORMAL EVALUATION 
AND NO MONITORING OF USE
As there are no formal processes to specifically govern the 
deployment of apps for health, they can be deployed easily 
and widely. When publishing via app stores, developers 
are provided with general guidelines for safety, privacy 
and performance. There are no requirements to comply 
with standards for software development and quality 
processes which are an important clinical governance 
strategy to ensure sound end products. A more funda-
mental problem is that there are no agreed standards 
for developing health apps,12 and efforts are underway to 
collate all the current standards, frameworks, best prac-
tices and guidelines.13 Where guidelines and standards 
exist, such as NICE’s guidelines for digital health technol-
ogies, they are not specifically intended for apps that are 
downloaded or purchased directly by users.8
Despite apps having a global market, thanks to the 
Internet and app stores, there is no global regulator; regu-
latory requirements for software as a medical device are 
not uniform worldwide.14 Take, for instance, a symptom 
checker that would be a class 1 medical device in the 
UK, but is not considered a medical device in Australia, 
and in the USA would not have regulations enforced by 
the Food and Drug Administration. Because developers 
are not required to demonstrate performance and show 
effectiveness, the quality of evaluation studies is poor,8 
and there is little attention to safety.15 Current European 
medical device regulation (CE marking) presumes apps 
are clinically effective, and therefore pushes liabilities 
for use errors, even if caused by software bugs, onto end 
users. Again, this contrasts with pharmaceutical devel-
opment, which includes registering experiments and a 
mature peer- reviewed publication culture.
Once apps are downloaded, their postmarket use goes 
largely unchecked, and even those apps that report use 
data have no awareness of the wider clinical condition or 
outcome. While agencies and institutions may monitor 
their apps as part of their internal clinical governance 
processes, there is no ongoing surveillance and oversight 
of apps that are published by citizen developers (nor 
are citizen developers resourced to provide postmarket 
support to users—note that successful apps can have 
millions of users across all time zones). App stores might 
remove apps in response to user feedback; however, 
studies show that ratings are not correlated with quality 
or safety, and therefore, user feedback is not relevant.16 17
APPS DIRECTLY REACH USERS
Apps that are accessed by consumers and patients outside 
formal care delivery increase risks because they can be 
used to make decisions without having to consult health 
professionals. Compared to a clinician who is a learned 
intermediary, when using a software system apps are a 
direct- to- consumer channel for health information and 
services that increases clinical risk and is vulnerable to 
data exploitation (eg, sharing patient data).18 Consumers 
and patients who use apps are a heterogenous user base 
with varying levels of health literacy and IT skills. Users 
lack the ability to search for and appraise the quality and 
trustworthiness of apps and their content.19 They may 
not have the skills to use an app in the manner that was 
intended by the designers. Their understanding, skills 
and physical state (especially given they are likely to be 
ill) may also affect their ability to detect, manage and 
report errors. Software updates are another responsibility 
for users but developers have no control over whether or 
not users instal updates: therefore, bug fixes and security 
updates might not be installed. There could be many 
different versions of an app in use, making it difficult to 
manage risks. While strategies to assist users in selecting 
and using apps, such as grading labels, may go some way 
towards reducing risks,20 the types of apps that are made 
available directly to consumers needs to be controlled.
DISCUSSION
Health apps are perhaps the most extreme example of 
challenges for clinical governance in the digital health 
ecosystem. While current efforts are usefully directed 
at curating the growing numbers of apps,20 they are 
not sustainable. A parallel strategy could focus on the 
preceding stages of the IT system life cycle to stem the 
growing tide of apps, by controlling their design, build 
and distribution.
As with any other digital technology, we need to 
consider apps from a problem- driven perspective by 
the health information or communication service they 
support. For example, consumer health information 
services should be based on standards for clinical content 
irrespective of whether they are delivered on web sites or 
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via apps. Similarly, information and communication for 
patient self- monitoring in asthma should be clinically 
driven, based on standards where they exist or best prac-
tice guidelines. Requirements relating to the channel of 
service delivery can be separately addressed via technical 
standards that are channel- specific. For instance, privacy 
and data security considerations need to be channel- 
specific because apps have more direct access to personal 
information compared to websites. Other channel- specific 
aspects that need to be covered via technical standards 
are usability, availability, interoperability and mainte-
nance, including updates. Such an approach is being 
considered for digital mental health services in Australia 
and could be applied to other health domains.21 A major 
advantage of this approach is that it does not consider 
apps in isolation but in context of the health services they 
support or the community. Ultimately, this might become 
a necessary way forward as we move to the omnichannel 
age where there will be seamless delivery of health infor-
mation and communication across different channels.22 
For instance, symptom checkers can be downloaded as 
apps or accessed on the web; a symptom checker service 
may be operated alongside a telephone helpline and a 
health information service.
Clinical and technical standards will provide a common 
framework for managing risks throughout the IT system 
life cycle and for operational oversight whether it is via 
developers self- certifying themselves, independent certi-
fication or regulation as medical devices. One possible 
avenue for common standards is via initiatives like the 
WHO and ITU processes for benchmarking artificial 
intelligence in health.23 Common evaluation standards 
underpin an evidence- based approach to digital health,24 
and are necessary as each level of oversight can provide 
a foundation for the next.25 With symptom checkers, self- 
certification by developers can form the basis of safety 
cases presented to regulators. The implementation and 
use of such apps in formal care delivery settings needs 
to be driven by appropriate guidelines and standards,11 26 
and operational oversight should be provided by organi-
sational processes for clinical governance.11 For example, 
a symptom checker operated by a public health informa-
tion service should be subject to internal clinical gover-
nance processes of the government agency operating the 
service.
The level of oversight needs to be proportional to the 
degree of risks that apps pose to users. An evidence- 
based approach that is informed by the current land-
scape of health apps is required. At present, there is no 
publicly available information about the number and 
types of health apps, who developed them, how they were 
developed and for how long have they been available, 
let alone the risks they incur. If the majority of low- risk 
health and wellness apps are being developed by cred-
ible health organisations and government agencies, then 
self- certification could be a viable option. These mecha-
nisms for oversight will need to be examined alongside 
regulations for software as a medical device. Operational 
oversight and surveillance can also be considered at a 
national and regional level using common frameworks 
so that it is possible to compare patterns over time and 
between settings, and to develop and prioritise preventive 
and corrective strategies.27
Our key conclusion is that the area of health apps is 
immature; this is unsurprising as apps are a radical and 
new development, which relies on sophisticated tech-
nology that has a record of frequent innovation. Patients, 
clinicians, developers and regulators are inevitably 
beholden to this current immaturity. Unlike established 
healthcare fields (eg, pharmaceuticals, radiotherapy, 
anaesthetics, etc) there is—as yet—no professional 
foundation, such as requiring certified and registered 
developers. Once there is a professional foundation, we 
envisage professional developers moving to regulation, 
just as registered pharmacists move into pharma regu-
lation—this is a slow process, but without it, regulation 
is likely to remain behind the curve. The role of citizen 
developers in this ecosystem needs to be carefully consid-
ered. Given IT’s record of continual radical innovation, 
regulatory lag is likely to be permanent, and therefore, 
an effective clinical governance response must be, or 
partly be, of a different sort than conventional regula-
tion. This paper has set out some of the issues that must 
be addressed. Ultimately, apps should not be considered 
just by their form but by their function and as part of the 
digital health ecosystem.
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